State of Utah v. Floyd Eugene Maestas : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1990
State of Utah v. Floyd Eugene Maestas : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Kenneth R. Brown; Brown & Cox; Attorney for Appellant.
R. Paul Van Dam; Attorney General; Attorneys for Respondent.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Maestas, No. 900443 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1990).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/2834
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BR»£F 
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
tCF «J 
56 
DOCKET NO. <?00W3~C*-
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
FLOYD EUGENE MAESTAS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from judgment and conviction of burglary, a second 
degree felony, theft, a class B misdemeanor, and being an habitual 
criminal, a first degree felony, in the Third Judicial District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
James S. Sawaya, Judge, residing. 
Kenneth R. Brown 
BROWN & COX 
10 West 300 South, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone (801) 363-3550 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone (801) 538-1015 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Respondent 
PILED 
DEC 2 8 1990 
Case No. 900443-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Mary T Noonan 
Clerk of the Court 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ] 
vs. 
FLOYD EUGENE MAESTAS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 900443-CA 
i Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from judgment and conviction of burglary, a second 
degree felony, theft, a class B misdemeanor, and being an habitual 
criminal, a first degree felony, in the Third Judicial District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
James S. Sawaya, Judge, residing. 
Kenneth R. Brown 
BROWN & COX 
10 West 300 South, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone (801) 363-3550 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone (801) 538-1015 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Respondent 
TABLE OF COK 
Table of Contents. 
" Authorities . . . 
uuii.saictic: .... -W *••:, .3 . . 
Statement of Issue Presented on Appea 
Determinati v t «onstitut.ic ::a 
Statement of tne Case 
.Si immar y :: f th = ?!i i: • g i ime i i I: 
Argument . , . 
Point I . . . . 
Point iiJ 
Point 
Certificate oi Service 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page 
Barker v. Wingof 407 U.S. 514 (1972) 13, 14 
Chambers v. Mississippi. 410 U.S. 284 (1973) . . . 20 
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978) . . . . 16, 17 
Payton v. New York. 445 U.S. 573 (1980) . . . . 14, 15 
Rock v. Arkansas. U.S. , 107 S.Ct. 
2704, 2712 (1987) 21 
State v. Ireland. P.2d , 108 Ut.Adv.Rpt. 
3 (Utah 1989) 18 
State v. Johnson, P.2d , 108 Ut.Adv.Rpt. 
44 (Utah 1989) 18 
State v. Nielsen. 727 P.2d 188, (Utah, 1986) 
cert denied. 107 S.Ct. 1565 (1987) 17 
State v. Northrup. 756 P.1228 (Ut.Ct.App. 1988) . . 15 
State v. Trafny, P.2d , 145 Ut.Adv.Rpt. 
13, 15 (Ut.Ct.App. 1990) 13 
U.S. v. Cuaron. 700 F.2d 482 (10th Cir. 1983) . . . 15 
United States v. Leon. 104 S.Ct. 3405 (1984) . . . 17 
Washington v. Texas. 388 U.S. 14 (1967) . . . . 18, 20 
ii 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ] 
vs. 
FLOYD EUGENE MAESTAS, ] 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 900443-CA 
i Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION OF COURT OF APPEALS 
This is an appeal from a judgment and commitment after a 
conviction for a number of felonies. Appellant filed his Notice 
of Appeal with the trial court, indicating that jurisdiction may 
be proper in either the Utah Supreme Court or the Utah Court of 
Appeals. Thereafter, the appeal was lodged with this Court and 
jurisdiction of this Court is therefore conferred by 78-2(a)-
3(2)(f), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
POINT I: WAS THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS TO A SPEEDY 
TRIAL VIOLATED BY A TRIAL OCCURRING SOME 
11 MONTHS AFTER THE DEFENDANT WAS 
ARRESTED, IN VIEW OF HIS MOTION LODGED 
WITH THE COURT FOR A SPEEDY TRIAL AND HIS 
DISPOSITION LETTER LODGED WITH THE UTAH 
STATE PRISON SOME NINE MONTHS PRIOR TO 
THE COMMENCEMENT OF TRIAL? 
DID THE COURT ERR IN FAILING TO SUPPRESS 
EVIDENCE SEIZED FROM THE DEFENDANT, BOTH 
IN A WARRANTLESS SEARCH (OF HIS PERSON) 
AND A SEARCH PURSUANT TO A WARRANT (OF 
HIS PROPERTY) IN VIOLATION OF THE 
DEFENDANT'S FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS AND 
ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION? 
DID THE COURT ERR IN FAILING TO PROPERLY 
INSTRUCT THE JURY REGARDING THE STATE'S 
BURDEN OF PROOF AND REASONABLE DOUBT IN 
VIEW OF CONTROLLING CASE LAW FROM THE 
UTAH SUPREME COURT? 
WAS THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS TO THE 
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AND HIS 
DUE PROCESS RIGHTS TO PRESENT A DEFENSE 
VIOLATED BY THE COURT'S ORDER PROHIBITING 
HIM FROM PRESENTING RELEVANT EVIDENCE AT 
TRIAL? 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The determinative constitutional provisions are as follows: 
1. Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah 
provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon 
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the person or thing to be seized. 
2. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated, and no warrants shall be issued, but upon 
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be 
searched and the persons or things to be seized. 
POINT II: 
POINT III: 
POINT IV: 
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3. Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution of Utah 
provides: 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty 
or property, without due process of law. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. Appellant was convicted of the 
crimes of burglary, a second degree felony, theft, a class B 
misdemeanor, and being an habitual criminal, a first degree felony, 
and sentenced to the Utah State Prison for the indeterminate term 
of from five years to life, on the first degree felony; from one 
to 15 years in the Utah State Prison on the second degree felony; 
and to six months on the class B misdemeanor. Said sentences to 
run concurrent, one with another. The proceedings occurred in the 
Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, on trial by jury, presided over by the Honorable James S. 
Sawaya, District Court Judge. 
B. Course of Proceedings. Appellant was convicted of the 
crimes of burglary, a second degree felony, theft, a class B 
misdemeanor, and being an habitual criminal, a first degree felony, 
and sentenced to the Utah State Prison for the indeterminate term 
of from five years to life, on the first degree felony; from one 
to 15 years in the Utah State Prison on the second degree felony; 
and to six months on the class B misdemeanor. Said sentences to 
run concurrent, one with another. The proceedings occurred in the 
Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, on trial by jury, presided over by the Honorable James S. 
Sawaya, District Court Judge. 
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On the 7th day of August, 1990, the defendant, through 
counsel herein, filed his Notice of Appeal, appealing the above-
referred to conviction to the Utah Supreme Court and/or the Utah 
Court of Appeals. Prior to trial, defendant filed a Motion to 
Suppress Illegally Seized Evidence, both evidence seized pursuant 
to warrant and evidence seized without a warrant; additionally, he 
filed a Motion to Dismiss for violation of defendant's speedy trial 
rights. All of these motions were denied by the Court and the 
matter went to trial. 
During the trial and at the conclusion of all the evidence, 
the Court instructed the jury regarding its burden of proof and 
reasonable doubt, which defendant believes constituted improper 
jury instructions on those issues. During the course of the trial, 
defendant attempted to illicit evidence from a witness regarding 
his whereabouts on the day of the occurrence of the crime. The 
State objected to the receipt of such evidence and the Court 
sustained that objection. Thereafter, defendant moved the Court 
for a mistrial on that basis, and that motion was denied by the 
Court. 
C. Disposition at Trial Court. A Judgment and Commitment 
in the case was entered by the Court on the 27th day of July, 1990, 
committing him to the Utah State Prison for the indeterminate term 
of from five years to life on the first degree felony, and from one 
to 15 years on the second degree felony. 
On the 7th day of August, 1990, defendant, through counsel, 
filed his Notice of Appeal. 
4 
u. Relevant Facts, 
i . Facts regarding defended^ ^ speejj triax isj^e 
Defendant was arrested at approximatel 
August *±, . ' ' agents of M u t Probation ami Parole 
:c an \mre- . , "- r s anscript, 
Volume 
iformatior charging m e defendant 
burglary, t .-.; * .-::, , * 
with the Court or ,r about September 12, 1989. r. ,4, ,. 
2 9) 
The defendant, b\ , 
fll ed a Request for Speedy Triai -:r cr arjout October 31, 
198S . (I * October 1989, 
defendant caused . . *;e [ J I U ^ ;i t .t */>,: ;» 
State Prison a >»-;*-:ce M~ Disposition, pursuant t:: tne 
I - \ 111 • i "* * "i served - ^n \<y 
of that Notice of Disposition o; t:,c Deputy Countv .. — 
prosecuting this ca?-: ;~^3) 
Ti: le del*- e charges i 
the District Court on November . H, I ?8^, e-^nt months r:*-: 
his arrest. (Tri a] Transcript, Volume I], pp. -"-3) 
"- • '),',' Fehi nai y I ! '»'• ; h»< •* i nq 'wiru^ -'-J without 
the defendant being present. A1 "h.il • i me, 
Transcript Volume I refers to transcript of proceeding 
covering March 9, 1990, through July 27, 1990; Transcript 
Volume II refers to transcript of proceeding commencing 
November 24, 19 89 and concluding February 16, 1990; "R" 
refers to the record * ippeal. 
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Bugdon, defendant's previous counsel, appeared before the 
Judge, with the Deputy County Attorney being present but 
the defendant not being present and asked to withdraw as 
counsel for the defendant. That Motion was granted, and 
counsel herein was appointed to represent the defendant 
thereafter. (Trial Transcript, Volume II, pp. 4-5) 
Prior to allowing previous counsel to withdraw, 
defendant caused to be filed pro se, a withdrawal of 
counsel, a letter to the judge indicating that a conflict 
with counsel existed and another letter dated February 1, 
1990, along with other various pro se motions, entitled 
Motion to Suppress Warrants. (Record, pp. 35-39. 
In a Minute Entry dated February 20, 1990, the Court 
cancelled the trial which was scheduled for February 22, 
1990, without a hearing or without the defendant being-
present. 
Counsel herein was appointed and appeared with the 
defendant on March 9, 1990 (Record, p. 48), and thereafter 
filed various motions prior to trial. 
The trial occurred on July 25, 1990. A full eleven 
plus months, from the date of defendant's arrest, and a 
full eight months from the date of defendant's arraignment, 
and nine months after the defendant's notice of disposition 
letter. (Record, p. 178, Tr. No. 1) 
2. Facts regarding search and seizure issue. 
On August 21, 1989, at approximately 10:30 p.m., 
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parole officers Scott Carver and Kevin Westover went to 
uei •. ' . : on 
defendant pursuant to n intensive parole agreement that 
defendant h=o witn *"he State of Utah. At that time, they 
were , • -• . * 1 le defendant was 
3t is girlfriend's house, L.na.« Villagrana. Pursuant to 
the terms of the intensive pare, agreement, defendant was 
under curfew terms ana 
Avenue address at t.L r * mf Based 
'milt; 1 on , officers Carver arid Westover went 
-• - .ilagrana home, arriving :,..*.;* , - / 
10:50 p.m. on that evening. (Tr. No 
* uie villagrana home, uiv 
observed through ine iro;,t window +-hp defendant runnii.-;. 
through the kitchen towards tie bacK ioor Officer Carver 
sei i t Off: ceit : Westover ai c:>i ;;n id t :: • the 1: ack of the residence, 
and Officer Carver hollered to Officer Westover t^at -
coming o r .»-).- Officer Westover went arouno :.• tr.e 
back I *• 
was still inside of * * *- house and ordered him :.J - i . 
then directed r*--' defendant to come out, the back doom to 
Of f : i i: i i ('" i II 
: time •. ; * tie officers seek either iiu arrest 
warrant, personally f • r- telephone, although both had oeen 
trained regarc. -
warrants. (Tr. No. I, pp. 2 8-43) 
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The defendant was arrested for a parole violation• 
(Record, p. 24) At the time of defendant's booking into 
the Salt Lake County Jail, he was searched and a piece of 
glass was retrieved from defendant's pant pocket and given 
to Officer Westover. (Tr. No. 1, p. 25) 
Officer Carver received a telephone call from the Salt 
Lake City Police Department on August 22, 1989, regarding 
the defendant's status as a suspect in the burglary and a 
request to turn over the glass to them. Officer Carver did 
that. (Tr. No. 1, p. 26) 
On August 28, 1989, a search warrant was obtained from 
a circuit court judge pursuant to an affidavit signed by 
Officer Jensen of the Salt Lake City Police Department. 
(Record, p. 71-86) In that Affidavit, Officer Jensen 
states: "They (the victims) discovered the suspect in this 
case, Floyd Maestas, inside, and chased him away." Officer 
Jensen did not tell the issuing Magistrate of that search 
warrant that the victims of the burglary had been provided 
with an opportunity to identify the defendant by photo 
spread, and had been unable to identify the defendant from 
that photo spread. (Tr. No. 1, p. 39) 
On September 7, 1989, another search warrant was 
sought and obtained from another circuit court judge, 
authorizing the seizure of certain property being held in 
a fiduciary capacity by the Salt Lake County Jail on the 
defendant's behalf. (Record, pp. 71-86) The affiant in 
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that affidavit was Officer Jensen, and the same language 
appedf MU I I. I In. <il 1 irj.i 'i 1 . I*. • if.fi' i*1 ' 1 that search warrant 
as referenced above. iT r , No. I |>- 10) 
The second search warrant authorized the seizure of 
defenudnt i, I lucid ""I1"fi«-»» l. i, i :sl ise.i reli «/.irrant . - u i t h o r i z e d t h e 
seizure of defendant's personal property. (Recor;. rr 7"i-
Facts regarding jury instruc^imu,. 
he conclusion of defendant'^ trii"1 +-he court 
i ns * * ! t regardin • burder of :,m ^  it ; 
reasonable dour: (Record, - - -• * 
alternative instructions or reasonable doubt, and the 
Lne reasonable alternative hypothesis 
instruction, which were rejectee - (Record, 
156-157) Exceptions were taken to tne Coi irt 
_ve defendants requested 
instructions. - .40-341) 
Facts regarding due process violation, 
> «»- \ < * rr. ed as a witness 
his girLfriend, who * *•> :-^ i *-» , ,, . T? *-he day and 
evening of August 2\
 t 19RL< - iefendant a t t e m p t e d 
e.1 iicl I, . - . uu where tne 
defendant had been r ~ugusL , , •<.. ^ through and 
including abou^ ^ r evening. Based upon the failure 
o I t li e, ue i «:; p tate 
objected to that evidence, a; .-. -. objectior was 
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sustained, thus preventing the defendant from presenting 
this evidence to the trier of fact. (Record, pp. 315, 337) 
At the next available recess, the defendant moved for 
mistrial based upon the Court's ruling. That motion was 
denied. (Tr. No. 1, pp. 337-339) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Because the trial of this case occurred some 11 months 
after the defendant's arrest, and nine months after he had 
requested the Court for a speedy trial and filed with the Utah 
State Prison a demand for disposition, the defendant's rights to 
a speedy trial were violated, and for that reason, the defendant's 
conviction should be reversed. 
The arrest of the defendant while inside his home without 
a warrant violated the defendant's right under the Fourth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution, and Article I, Section 14 of the 
Utah State Constitution to be free from unreasonable searches and 
seizures. And for such reason, the defendant's conviction should 
be reversed and he should be given a new trial. 
The search warrants obtained in this case were obtained 
based upon statements made in the affidavit by a police officer 
which were known to be false, or were made in reckless disregard 
of the truth of the statement. Without that false information, 
there was not sufficient probable cause to authorize the search 
warrant's issuance by the Magistrate. 
The jury was improperly instructed by the Court as to the 
burden of proof in a criminal case and the standard of reasonable 
10 
doubt, Recent case law from the Utah Supreme Court supports the 
: • -
 j
 i>eing the 
appropriate instruction i . *. • . *L.* . U . L..^  :. J 4, -^  h^ jury the 
proper instruction should result in a reversal of defendant's 
<. ( H I / 1 1 . L i "i )i ii I i* " ' » ' ' ' i Ii I . 
The defendant's uue process rights ir guaranteed Kvr the 
Federal Constitution and Article Section of -.< j State 
LonaiJLUi 111in ,, i,.)U(j r a n Let;,1 . - <* - : : --r*t 
relevant evidence regarding his gui.* laie law requirinc the 
defendant to provide notice n+" a!?M ^*- l failing there, resu!" in 
an order prohibi ti rug ... .- - -^  ;^L ,f y 
violates the defendant's due process rights, both under the Federal 
r - * • - Km ii and the Utah State Constitution, in Artie 1 e I, Section 
; r k iefendant shoula i;-e -given a new tr i a] :i n ti la t ti le Cour t' s 
denia; of defendant's, Motion for Mistrial was in error. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT T: THE DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL AND 
STATUTORY RIGHTS TO A SPEEDY TRIAL AND 
DISPOSITION OF PENDING CHARGES WERE 
VIOLATED AS A RESULT OF THE DEFENDANT'S 
TRIAL OCCURRING 11 MONTHS AFTER HIS 
ARREST, WHEN HE HAD REQUESTED AN EARLY 
TRIAL, AND PURSUANT TO UTAH LAW, HAD 
REQUESTED THAT THE MATTER BE TRIED WITHIN 
120 DAYS. 
IOWS: 
After written demand as required in subsection 
(1), the prosecuting or the defendant or his 
counsel, for good cause shown in open court, with 
the prisoner or his counsel being present, may be 
granted any reasonable continuance. 
In the ev ent the charge is not brought to 
trial wi t:h:i i ] 20 dayr or within such continuance 
] 1 
as has been granted, and defendant or his counsel 
moves to dismiss the action, the court shall review 
the proceeding. If the court finds the failure of 
the prosecuting attorney to have the matter heard 
within the time required is not supported by good 
cause, whether a previous motion for continuance 
was made or not, the court shall order the matter 
dismissed with prejudice. 
It is important to note that at not time did defendant, 
either pro se or through his appointed lawyer, move the Court for 
a continuance. He provided the prosecuting attorney with a copy 
of his letter regarding his request for disposition of the pending 
charges. The February 16, 1990 hearing in which his previous 
lawyer was allowed to withdraw occurred without the defendant being 
present. Even in that hearing, there was no motion for 
continuance sought. The State of Utah cannot escape responsibility 
for not trying Mr. Maestas within the time period by pointing to 
the fact that he apparently had some conflict with previous 
counsel. The statute is clear that the State bears the burden of 
convincing the trial court first, and then this court, that 
whatever continuances were sought, obtained and granted, were for 
"good cause shown." In this case, there is simply no "good cause 
shown" why this matter was continued some 11 months after this 
man's arrest. 
Additionally, the statute does not require that the 
defendant suffer prejudice in order to avail himself of the 
provisions of this particular statute. The statute simply provides 
that the Court review the proceedings, and in the event that the 
Court concludes that the statute was not complied with, then he 
shall dismiss the matter with prejudice. It is appellant's 
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contention that under Utah law, the matter should not have been 
tried in violation of Utah law. 
The constitutional speedy trial right is a little 
different. The seminal case of Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 
(1972), sets forth the constitutional analysis for speedy trial 
issues. 
In Barker, the Court established four factors to be 
considered when evaluating whether a pretrial delay violates the 
Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial: (1) the length of the 
delay; (2) the justification for the delay; (3) that nature of the 
prejudice to the accused; and (4) the degree to which the accused 
asserted his right to be tried promptly. None of the factors is 
absolutely determinative of the issue; rather, each factor is 
related and must be considered in conjunction with the others. A 
strong showing of prejudice is not necessarily a prerequisite to 
a speedy trial violation. Moreover, the prosecution cannot 
inadvertently avoid the sanction of dismissal by asserting that the 
delay was inadvertent. 
This Court, in State v. Trafny, P.2d , 145 
Ut.Adv.Rpt. 13, 15 (Ut.Ct.App. 1990) has adopted the Barker test. 
In analyzing the four Barker factors. There can be no 
question that the length of delay was significant. Additionally, 
there can be no question that the delay that occurred was not 
justified. Lastly, the degree to which the accused asserted his 
right to be tried promptly weighs in the favor of the defendant. 
Not only did he file a request to the Court for a speedy trial, but 
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he also complied with Utah law in requesting that the matter be 
disposed of within the statutory period of time. The factors of 
prejudice to the accused is somewhat more troubling. The existence 
of prejudice must be evaluated in light of the purposes underlying 
the right to a speedy trial. As noted in Barker, those purposes 
are the prevention of oppressive incarceration; the minimization 
of anxiety; and the impairment of a defense. 
In this case, though the defendant is unable to establish 
with mathematical precision the prejudice associated with the 
delay, the important constitutional principals recognized in 
affording a person a speedy trial should be protected by this Court 
in the absence of a strong showing of prejudice. 
POINT II: THE COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO SUPPRESS 
EVIDENCE SEIZED FROM THE DEFENDANT AT 
THE TIME OF HIS ARREST AND EVIDENCE 
SEIZED FROM HIM PURSUANT TO WARRANTS 
WHICH WERE FLAWED. 
The arrest of the defendant for violating the terms and 
conditions of his parole without a warrant violated the defendant's 
Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable searches and 
seizures, both under the Federal and State Constitutions. The 
officers were obligated to acquire a warrant before entering his 
residence to arrest him. 
The United States Supreme Court addressed this very issue 
in Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980). In holding that absent-
consent or exigency, an arrest warrant is required before a suspect 
can be arrested in his home. The Supreme Court acknowledged in 
Payton that a basic principle of constitutional law is that a 
14 
warrant is required before a person may be arrested in his home. 
Lower courts have continued to address the ramifications 
of the Payton decision, and have concluded that the meaning of 
"home" extends to motel rooms and other such facilities. 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has concluded in U.S. 
v. Cuaron, 700 F.2d 482 (10th Cir. 1983) that one of the factors 
to be considered in determining whether exigent circumstances exist 
was the time required to obtain a telephonic warrant. Recognizing 
that the requirement of the warrant to enter a person's home is 
almost absolute, regardless of the abundance of probable cause or 
other reasons which justify the intrusion. 
The Utah Court of Appeals, in State v. Northrup, 756 P.1228 
(Ut.Ct.App. 1988) has recognized the viability of the Payton 
analysis based on Utah constitutional law in connection with a 
warrantless search or arrest in an individual's home. 
In Northrup, a co-defendant had been given money on two 
separate occasions by police officers and had entered the 
defendant's home and returned with cocaine. On the date of the 
entry, this defendant was arrested after coming out of the 
defendant's home, and another individual had been stopped and held 
for questioning until later that evening. The officers then 
entered the defendant's home without a warrant. After entering the 
home, the officers secured a search warrant and executed that 
warrant and seized various items of incriminating evidence. This 
Court held, in striking down the warrantless search, as follows: 
First we examine whether the police officers' 
entry into the home prior to the arrival of the 
15 
search warrant violated Northrup's rights under the 
Fourth Amendment to the United State's 
Constitution. Physical entry of the home is the 
chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth 
Amendment is directed. (citations omitted) The 
warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, which 
is imposed on agents of the government who seek to 
enter a home for purposes of search or arrest, is 
the principal protection against unnecessary 
intrusions into private dwellings, thus, the United 
States Supreme Court has recognized as a basic 
principle, that search and seizures inside the home 
without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable. 
It is important to keep in mind the facts associated with 
the arrest. The officer's testimony was clear that he indicated 
to the defendant that he should "halt" while the defendant was 
still inside of his home. Thereafter, he proceeded out of the home 
only at the officer's direction. 
The evidence seized pursuant to warrants was seized in 
violation of Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978) and for such 
reason the warrants should fail. In both of the affidavits for 
search warrants, the following language appeared: 
They discovered the suspect in this case, 
Floyd Maestas, inside and chased him away. One 
warrant authorized the seizure of a yellow gold 
chain with a cross and clothing. The other warrant 
authorized the seizure of defendant's blood. 
In Franks v. Delaware, supra, the United States Supreme 
Court held that when a defendant makes a veracity challenge to an 
affidavit in support of a search warrant, he is entitled, upon a 
showing, to an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the false 
information was deliberately made or made with reckless disregard 
for its truth. If at the hearing these requirements are met, the 
false information is to be taken out and the affidavit is to be 
16 
evaluated for probable cause, absent the falsity. If the false 
information conveyed in the affidavit, to wit, that the victims had 
indicated that they specifically identified the defendant in their 
house, the affidavit is completely devoid of any probable cause to 
issue the respective warrants. 
The Utah Supreme Court has dealt with a Franks violation 
in State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188, (Utah, 1986) cert denied, 107 
S.Ct. 1565 (1987). See also State v. Nielsen: immaterial false 
statements in search warrant affidavits. 87 U.L.R., 753. 
It is clear that a Franks violation survives the modified 
exclusionary rule of United States v. Leon, 104 S.Ct. 3405 (1984). 
The "exclusionary rule" as modified in Leon, requires suppression 
of evidence obtained in violation of Franks. In Leon, the Court 
held at 3419: 
Suppression therefore remains an appropriate 
remedy. If the magistrate or judge, in issuing a 
warrant, was misled by information in an affidavit 
that the affiant knew was false or would have known 
was false except for his reckless disregard of the 
truth. 
The statement in the affidavits would lead an issuing 
magistrate to conclude that the victims of this crime observed the 
defendant, Floyd Maestas, in their home and chased him out. In 
truth and in fact, the witnesses had been shown a photo spread 
containing a picture of Mr. Maestas and were unable to identify 
him. 
POINT III: THE JURY WAS IMPROPERLY INSTRUCTED 
REGARDING THE REASONABLE DOUBT STANDARD 
AND THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN A CRIMINAL 
CASE. 
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In this case, the Court gave the stock reasonable doubt 
instruction with language familiar to everyone and the following 
addition: "and obviates all reasonable doubt." The defendant's 
proposed reasonable doubt instruction was an attempt to track 
Justice Stewart's dissenting opinion in State v. Ireland, P.2d 
, 108 Ut.Adv.Rpt. 3 (Utah 1989). 
Justice Stewart's dissenting opinion in Ireland became a 
concurring opinion in State v. Johnson, P.2d , 108 
Ut.Adv.Rpt. 44 (Utah 1989). 
It is defendant's contention that his proposed reasonable 
doubt instruction tracks the Ireland and Johnson cases. The 
reasonable doubt instruction given by the Court did not take into 
consideration the important issues raised by the above-cited cases, 
and for said reasons, it was error to give that instruction. This 
Court should direct trial courts to frame a proper reasonable doubt 
instruction so that a jury can be adequately advised regarding the 
burden of proof in a criminal case. 
POINT IV: THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING PROHIBITING 
DEFENDANT FROM PRESENTING EXCULPATORY 
EVIDENCE DENIED HIM HIS DUE PROCESS AND 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OF CALLING WITNESSES 
TO ESTABLISH A DEFENSE, AND HE IS 
ENTITLED TO A REVERSAL OF HIS CONVICTION. 
In 1967, the United States Supreme Court rendered its 
landmark decision in the case of Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 
(1967). In that case, the Court dealt with the constitutionality 
of two Texas statutes providing that an accused could not call as 
a defense witness any person chcirged or previously convicted as a 
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principal, accomplice, or accessory in the crime. Texas law 
rendered such persons incompetent as defense witnesses; the 
statutes altogether precluded the accused from calling them as 
witnesses at trial. 
The accused, Jackie Washington, was charged with murder. 
Washington attempted to call Charles Fuller as a witness. Fuller 
had already been convicted of murder in the same shooting incident. 
Citing the two Texas statutes, the prosecutor objected to Fuller's 
testimony; the trial judge sustained the objection. Without the 
benefit of Fuller's exculpatory testimony, Washington was 
convicted. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction. In doing 
so, the Court issued two significant rulings. 
First, writing for the majority, Chief Justice Warren held 
that the compulsory process guarantee is so fundamental that it is 
incorporated in the due process provision of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The guarantee is therefore enforceable directly against 
the states. 
Second, and even more importantly, the Court held that the 
Texas statutes violated the guarantee. Texas had argued that it 
had not denied Washington compulsory process; it allowed him to 
subpoena Fuller—it merely precluded him from calling Fuller as a 
witness. Chief Justice Warren concluded that "The framers of the 
Constitution did not intend to commit the futile act of giving to 
a defendant the right to secure the attendance of witnesses whose 
testimony he has no right to use." 
The Court went on to state: 
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This court had occasion In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 
(1948) to describe . . . the most basic ingredients 
of due process of law: "a person's right to 
reasonable notice of a charge against him, and an 
opportunity to be heard in his defense—a right to 
his day in court—are basic in our system of 
jurisprudence; and these rights include, as a 
minimum, a right to examine the witnesses against 
him and to offer testimony." 
The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, 
and to compel their attendance, if necessary, is 
in plain terms the right to present a defense, the 
right to present the defendant's version of the 
facts as well as the prosecution's to the jury so 
it may decide where the truth lies. Just as an 
accused has the right to confront the prosecution's 
witnesses for the purpose of challenging their 
testimony, he has the right to present his own 
witnesses to establish a defense. This right is 
a fundamental element of due process of law.2 
The Supreme Court in 1973 reaffirmed the Washington 
doctrine when it decided Chambers v. Mississippif 410 U.S. 284 
(1973). One of the alleged constitutional errors in that case was 
the trial judge's exclusion of critical exculpatory hearsay 
evidence. The Court powerfully reaffirmed Washington. Citing 
Washington, Justice Powell found the trial judge's ruling violated 
the accused's "right to present witnesses in his own defense." The 
court thus refused to apply the right only to competency rules 
altogether barring a witness' testimony; the court extended the 
right to evidentiary rules which have the more limited effect of 
preventing a witness from giving particular testimony. Justice 
Powell stressed that the testimony in question was not only 
critical to Chamber's defense, but also bore "persuasive assurances 
2
 See Edward J. Imwinkelried, Amendment VI: The compulsory 
process clause, September-October 1990, The Champion. 
20 
of trustworthiness." Coupled with another erroneous ruling, the 
exclusion of the hearsay evidence "denied Chambers a trial in 
accord . . . with due process." 
More recently, the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed 
this fundamental principal in Rock v. Arkansas, U.S. , 107 
S.Ct. 2704, 2712 (1987). In Rock, the United States Supreme Court 
recognized that a state's rule barring a previously hypnotized 
witness from testifying regarding post-hypnotic recall violated a 
defendant's almost absolute right to offer evidence in his defense, 
when the defendant himself had been hypnotized. The Supreme Court 
recognized that this "fundamental right" cannot be impaired through 
a per se rule excluding hypnotically enhanced testimony. 
The Rock case arose in a jurisdiction which followed a per 
se rule barring the admission of hypnotically refreshed testimony. 
The United States Supreme Court in Rock directly held that an 
evidentiary rule could not defeat a constitutional provision and 
that the right of a defendant to testify, even after hypnosis, was 
part of that "cluster" of rights which are beyond the reach of 
mundane evidentiary rules.3 
The Trial Court's ruling, excluding the presentation of 
evidence, which is not properly characterized as alibi evidence, 
constituted a violation of the defendant's due process rights as 
articulated above. 
3
 Incidentally, when a Constitutional violation occurs 
affecting that "cluster" of rights, the violation is not 
subject to harmless error analysis. See Washington v. 
Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967). 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, appellant's convictions should 
be reversed and dismissed with prejudice, or a new trial ordered. 
DATED this day of December, 1990. 
BROWN & COX 
By: 
KENNETH R. BROWN 
Attorneys for Defendant/ 
Appellant 
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